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Abstract
A mental health crisis is looming large, and needs to be ad-
dressed. But across age groups, even just in the United States,
more than 50% of people with any mental illness (AMI) did
not seek or receive any service or treatment [49]. The prolifer-
ation of telehealth and telepsychiatry tools and systems [8,12]
can help address this crisis, but outside of traditional regu-
latory aspects on privacy, e.g. Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPPA), there does not seem to be
enough attention on the security needs, concerns, or user ex-
perience of people with AMI using those telehealth systems.
In this text, I try to explore some priority security properties
for telehealth systems used by people with AMI for mental
heath services (MHS). I will also suggest some key steps in a
proposed process for designing and building security mech-
anisms into such systems, so that security is accessible and
usable to patients with AMI, and these systems can achieve
their goals of ameliorate this mental health crisis.f
1 Introduction
Mental health issues are prevalent around all of us, and the
scale is staggering. Within the United States alone, in 2017,
46.6 million adults had a mental illness, 49.5% of adolescents
had any mental disorder, and 10.6 million adults seriously
considered suicide [1, 49]. Estimates are that 50% of mental
illness begins by age 14, and 75% by 24, while suicide is the
third biggest cause of death for age group 10 – 24, among
whom 90% had underlying mental illness [9, 50]. Telehealth
and telepsychiatry tools and systems have been developed
with the hope to help address this crisis, and while they all
must comply to HIPPA, there is a missing dimension: psycho-
logically acceptable security to people with AMI.
The “psychological acceptability” principle is identified as
“usable” in 1975 [59], but it wasn’t until the 1990s, that “usable
security” started to get its due attention [52, 74]. Moreover,
the audience of “psychological acceptability” is open and
wide: to whom, or to what audience are the security measures
and mechanisms psychologically acceptable? What if the
psychological or mental state of the audience is impaired, or
the audience has mental disorders?
This question is open, wide, and more importantly, tricky.
While it is relatively easy to diagnose and notice cognitive im-
pairment and neurocognitive disorders as they manifest in do-
mains such as attention, recognition, and language [28,46,57],
the vast majority of people with mental illness keep function-
ing in daily lives [10]. What is even trickier, is that mental
disorder may eventually turn to affect cognition and behav-
iors, as Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM, latest edition DSM-5) defines a mental disorder as “...a
syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance
in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behav-
iors...” [11]. How might we build security into telehealth
systems, which would be relied upon by many with mental
illness, who a diverse and complex, but under-served and
usually invisible user base? This is a question worth asking
and solving. In this work, I will propose some priority prop-
erties of security in telehealth systems used for MHS, and
suggest some key steps in a process when building usable
and secure telehealth systems for people with AMI. Here
I will adapt [56]’s definition of telehealth, to better suit the
MHS context. While it is still fundamentally ”the use of elec-
tronic information and telecommunication technologies to
support long-distance clinical health care etc.,” providers
of MHS via telehealth need not to be only human — they
can be automated, interactive agents such as social bots, e.g.
conversational agents (colloquially “chatbots”).
2 Related Work
For security and usable security, much has been written and
researched. However, even though “psychological accept-
ability” to users was proposed as a key principle for secu-
rity, it only started getting attention much later. Meanwhile,
security measures keep confusing users [2, 19, 60, 70, 74].
Moreover, the “psychological acceptability” principle is of-
ten doubted as incompatible with the goal of “security”
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[13, 22, 51, 54, 61, 64, 73, 74], and usable security is still a
small community compared to other areas of security research.
Also, as [69] points out, usable security is designed with the
general population in mind, and may leave out specific vul-
nerable groups that are under-served. This leaves us not a
deep foundation to work with, when we consider building
psychologically acceptable security, for those whose mental
state may suffer from disorders or illness, and into systems
that many of them may rely on to get treatment and services.
But more recently, usable security for vulnerable groups
is getting more attention, especially on older adults and the
visually impaired, thanks to works such as [3, 4, 18, 23, 33,
44, 48, 48, 55, 66, 72] from both usable security and human-
computer interaction (HCI) communities. On cognitively im-
paired users, [43] did an excellent user study on older adults
with mild congnitive impairments and their online security
behaviors on sharing passwords and identity information, and
while it discussed risks options and gave examples on access
and control, it stopped short of providing security-specific
suggestions, properties, principles, or processes. [42] inves-
tigated behaviors of certain cognitively impaired users on
authentication methods, but only in a simulated e-commerce
setting, not in telehealth systems used for MHS: such systems
hold a lot more sensitive information and interactions from
and about the users.
On the other hand, the rise of telehealth systems for mental
health (e.g. social bots and online therapy) has prompted ac-
tive research from the HCI community and health researchers
[6, 7, 14–17, 20, 25, 26, 30, 37, 41, 53, 63, 71], but their pri-
mary focus is on users’ experience in treatment, their system
interaction experiences, and effects of therapy, and did not
give much consideration to security — the psychologically
acceptable type of security — to users with AMI. [71] uncov-
ered the general “tensions with technology” among members
of several peer-support therapy groups, and while it identi-
fied “anonymity, identity, access” as parts of the tensions, it
focuses on user experiences and participation, and did not
address inclusive security.
For telehealth systems, at least in the United States, the
federal and state guideline on their security mechanisms are
inconsistent [65], and while medical professionals have pro-
posed [21, 27, 39, 40, 67] measures to improve security in
telehealth systems, those measures are largely targeting secu-
rity concerns of medical institutions [38] and tend to be more
policy- and administration-oriented than patient-focused.
3 A Proposal on Properties & Process
These properties are by no means exhaustive or authoritative.
They are my early explorations into making security methods,
mechanisms, and designs that are easily accessible and us-
able by people with AMI. Most, if not all of these properties
have been discussed in general computer science and security
literature before. However, putting them into the context for
providing security to people with AMI accessing MHS via
telehealth systems, places them in high priority positions for
the practical design and implementation of those telehealth
systems used for MHS.
3.1 Some Priority Properties
Trust-inducing As [71] illustrates, distrust of technology
(e.g. videochats, social networks, cloud data storage)
forms the basis of tension with technology in several
peer-support therapy groups, and older adults with cogni-
tive impairment are concerned about their privacy when
doing art therapy online too [20]. With this distrust of
general technology already in the minds of users who
seek MHS, it is extremely important for telehealth sys-
tems — which handles more sensitive data, content, and
interactions than general technology platforms and ser-
vices — to earn and induce trust from users to ensure
and encourage adoption and usage. But security mea-
sures — good security measures — could easily confuse
or mislead users [2, 19, 58, 60, 70, 74], and when confu-
sion and misdirection in telehealth systems happen to
users with AMI seeking MHS, these users may withdraw
altogether from using telehealth systems, and their with-
drawal may have larger and more detrimental effects on
their well-being than the general population withdrawing
from telehealth systems.
Robust By definition [11], mental disorders can disrupt a
person’s behaviors and cognition, and such disturbances
may not be within considerations of user models or be-
havioral expectations of general usable security, which
has the general population in mind. Therefore, it would
be wise to expect more errors, faults, and unexpected
inputs or behaviors from users with AMI, and let this
expectation lead to the building of more robustness into
security measures of telehealth systems used for MHS.
Robustness is especially important to telehealth sys-
tems whose providers of MHS are automated interactive
agents, which are more affordable and accessible than
human MHS providers. They are very likely to be relied
upon more by people with AMI whose socio-economic
status and life circumstances could not afford them to
human MHS providers, and without more robustness,
these automated interactive agents may deny access to
care to users needing the care most.
Cooperative MHS is naturally a cooperative process, with
interactions between patients, providers, other caregivers,
and peers active and evolving in the MHS process. Peo-
ple with AMI may have delegated certain powers to
caregivers other than their providers, and may also seek
MHS with others in scenarios such as family therapy
and peer-support group therapies. In the light of this
situation, it sounds sensible to consider making certain
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security mechanisms and features cooperative. But this
cooperative nature of MHS may pose legal challenges for
security: take the U.S. for example, a shared password,
even a voluntarily shared one, counts as unauthorized
access by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, despite
technology policy organizations’ persistent activism [20].
In spite of this challenge, there are times when such
sharing and other cooperative procedures are necessary
during one’s life span. Telehealth systems used for MHS
should proactively consider building security measures
that address the roles and functions of caregivers, peers,
partners, etc., and in the process of delivering MHS, to
actively communicate the system’s cooperative aspect
of security to users.
Functional This may sound silly and obvious, but given the
infamous security-functionality trade-off [5, 32, 36, 47,
74] even for the general population, it is worth empha-
sizing functionality when designing security to include
people with AMI, who need MHS provided via telehealth
systems more than the general population. Usable secu-
rity measures should not become obstacles for people
with AMI when they access telehealth systems’ care-
providing capabilities, and ideally, should not degrade
their general user experiences either.
Fail gracefully Security methods, however carefully de-
signed and built, may still fail to guide users towards the
right path of actions, but a graceful failure can help lead
users to the right path next time. When the telehealth sys-
tems’ security mechanism fails to elicit the right actions
from users with AMI, how should the system respond,
so next time users can do the right things? Given men-
tal disorders could affect cognition and behavior, would
users with AMI react differently to security warnings
and failure messages as the general population do? If
so, how different and in what aspects? What post-failure
contents or actions, educational or otherwise, from the
telehealth system can help users do the right thing the
next time? These are important questions to consider,
when designing and building security mechanisms in
telehealth systems to provide MHS to users with AMI.
3.2 Process: Some Key Steps
Based on preceding discussion, it is now helpful to start con-
templating the practical aspect of building those priority se-
curity properties into telehealth systems used for MHS. I
propose some key steps to make security inclusive to users
with AMI, and invite the wider usable security community to
further contribute to, discuss, debate, utilize, improve, and ar-
chitect processes that would engineer more inclusive security
mechanisms in telehealth systems for people with AMI.
Build inclusive mental models [34] advocates for formal
methods when building mental models for inclusive se-
curity’s user models, and in practice, it might be realistic
to first build mental models for the security concerns and
potential ranges of behaviors for a sub-population of peo-
ple with AMI, whom the telehealth system targets. These
users may differ and diverge from the general population
on how they perceive, expect, and manage security and
risk in telehealth systems, and their behaviors can range
wider than the general population when it comes to use
security methods. Including these considerations about
the concerns and behaviors of people with AMI, would
be the first step towards inclusive security in telehealth
systems providing MHS.
An example: young adults with attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) who seek
conversational therapy from an automated agent
(“chatbot”) online. While CAPTCHA methods could
help protect the chatbot against spams, users with
ADHD — who generally have shorter attention spans
than a general population [45] — may be more likely to
abandon efforts to go through CAPTCHAs, especially
when there are multiple and come one after another in
various forms (e.g. text, sound, or images recognition).
They may even leave with the belief that such a
security mechanism is set up to trick them or deny
them access. Here, an inclusive mental model of user
behaviors does not only help users access MHS, but
also encourage creative solutions. For instance, instead
of human-recognition-based CAPTCHAs which may
require sustained non-interactive attention, might a
30-second “trial conversation” with the chatbot to decide
“human-or-not ” be useful?
Incorporate clinical providers’ inputs Continuing on the
previous point, understanding and modeling behaviors
and concerns of people with AMI, cannot be done in a
vacuum or in an armchair checking off criteria in DSM-
51. To build realistic user models and their mental mod-
els of security, consulting clinical practitioners on what
ranges of behaviors to expect from patients with AMI
seeking MHS, would be helpful. Practically speaking,
incorporating clinicians views is the next best available
approach, short of actual target user research and inter-
views: in environments where AMI is stigmatized, peo-
ple with AMI may not be willing to disclose their condi-
tions to researchers, let alone wanting to be interviewed,
observed, and studied for their behaviors using telehealth
systems. Whenever pragmatic and viable, user research
is still the preferred and best method of research and user
modeling, but in its absence, a good alternative would
1DSM provides a common framework for describing psychopathology,
and it is strongest in its reliability. Meanwhile, there has always been contro-
versies around DSM about its criteria, categorization, characterization, and
clinical validity [35, 68].
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be to seek clinicians’ inputs on the online behavioral
patterns they have observed in their patients while pro-
viding MHS, and then to extract possible mental models
of security of people with AMI.
Consider cooperative situations in security As described
in section 3.1, MHS is cooperative by nature, and in
the context of telehealth systems in MHS, “cooperations”
can happen between human beings and automated inter-
active agents. Hence, building technical security mecha-
nisms and writing user-facing security communications
(e.g. user agreements) that would allow security to be
cooperative in certain MHS contexts, would be one im-
portant way that telehealth systems can make security
more inclusive for people with AMI seeking MHS.
Define boundaries of cooperation While cooperation is im-
portant in MHS, it is also crucial to not idealize it in
security settings, especially for security in MHS. Bound-
ary violations between providers and patients seeking
MHS, and exploitation of those patients from their care-
givers and peers [24, 29, 31, 62] can and do happen in
off-line settings. When MHS is provided online via tele-
health systems, the boundary and exploitation problems
only get more complex with all the security methods
and mechanisms in place, so that people with AMI can
access MHS. When designing and building cooperative
aspects of security in telehealth systems used for MHS,
we should also consider drawing boundaries between
those principal users with AMI who seek MHS, and the
extent to which their providers, caregivers, and peers
could influence and change the security decisions, set-
tings, and behaviors of these principal users.
Tailor communications This is a logical conclusion follow-
ing all preceding points. What works well for general
populations in general systems to enhance security —
e.g. pop-up warnings, color-coded buttons, push notifi-
cations, conventional user interfaces etc. — may or may
not work well with people with AMI seeking MHS via
telehealth system. What is more, certain users with AMI
may also be cognitively impaired, posing even more chal-
lenges. Having built inclusive and diverse user models,
it makes sense to implement an inclusive and diverse set
of communications paradigms and tools — ranging from
warning message re-writes to user interfaces customiza-
tion — so that each user model is accounted for when
encountering security mechanisms in telehealth systems.
Evaluate failures During early stage development and
small-scale user trials, it is important to document and
evaluate failures, where security mechanisms and meth-
ods fail to lead people with AMI to the right action paths
or accomplish their purposes. Those failures may be due
to incorrect assumptions about user behaviors, insuffi-
cient robustness, unclear warnings and failures, incorrect
implementations, or a variety of other reasons. Regard-
less of the reason, learning from those failures and how
they might have become hurdles to actual patients using
telehealth systems for MHS, or in fact have motivated
insecure behaviors, would be very valuable lessons to
inform future inclusive security designs and implementa-
tions for people with AMI not only in telehealth systems,
but also in general technology services and products.
4 Future Work
This is still early stage work, and the landscape of building
inclusive security for people with AMI is an open field with
many open problems and solutions. These properties and steps
are a suggestion, an invitation, and an encouragement for the
usable security and inclusive security community to examine,
understand, and build towards the security needs of people
with AMI. Telehealth systems used for MHS are the most
obvious first target, and the lessons we will have learned here
could inspire, expand into, transferred to, and be adapted in
security designs and mechanisms of other technology services
and products to include more under-served groups.
One direction that I might consider to carry this research
forward, is to observe, research, conduct interviews on, and
evaluate security behaviors in a specific sub-population of
people with AMI, for example, adults with ADHD, who use
telehealth systems to access MHS provided by automated,
interactive agents. Another possible direction is to evaluate
current security solutions in a popular telehealth systems used
for MHS, and how these solutions are inclusive or exclusive
towards certain people with AMI.
5 Conclusion
With mental health issues prevalent in our societies and tele-
health systems proliferating, more people with mental illness
are and may start seeking mental health services via telehealth
systems. However, there does not seem to be enough discus-
sion on how, and if, security considerations in telehealth sys-
tems are including people with mental illness, who may very
likely have large cognitive and behavioral deviations from the
general population, for whom many security mechanisms are
designed and built.
In this text, I shared some security properties that should
be prioritized when building telehealth systems for people
with mental illness to access mental heath services. I also
suggested some key steps when designing and building secu-
rity mechanisms and experiences into those systems. I hope
that readers can take away not only awareness in the secu-
rity needs of people with mental illness, but also insights on
how the usable security community can start contributing to
this important but under-served population that deserve our
attention when building usable and inclusive security.
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